The split decision clarifies sentencing standards under the Youth Criminal Justice Act
To determine whether a young criminal defendant should be sentenced as an adult rather than as a youth, courts must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant lacks the “diminished moral blameworthiness” that the law presumes young people have due to their still-developing maturity and judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in a split decision on Friday.
The court confirmed in R. v. I.M. that under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, meeting this criteria only satisfies the first part of a two-prong test that needs to be passed for a young defendant to be sentenced as an adult. The second prong also requires a court to be satisfied that a youth sentence would not be long enough to hold the defendant accountable. However, the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not apply to this second prong.
According to the SCC, sentencing judges must engage with each of the two prongs separately. A “blended approach” does not take into account “the context and purpose of the YCJA that enshrines, distinct from accountability, the general principle of diminished moral culpability of young persons enshrined in s. 3(1)(b).”
In a separate decision on Friday, the court applied this reasoning to a case involving another young criminal defendant called R. v. S.B. Justice Nicholas Kasirer wrote the majority opinion in both decisions. Justices Suzanne Côté and Malcolm Rowe dissented in both cases.
In R. v. I.M., the defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offence, was part of a planned robbery in which he beat and stabbed another 17-year old. The victim died from his wounds.
The defendant and his co-assailants then entered the victim’s home to search for firearms and pistol-whipped the victim’s mother.
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, and the sentencing judge imposed an adult sentence based on the finding that he had the maturity of an adult and that a youth sentence would not be sufficient. A Court of Appeal upheld the sentence.
However, the SCC majority disagreed with the lower courts’ conclusions. It set aside the adult sentence and imposed a youth sentence of six years’ custody and four years’ conditional supervision.
According to the majority, the sentencing judge erred by considering the seriousness of the defendant’s offence while assessing whether he lacked diminished moral blameworthiness. Instead, the sentencing judge should have looked at factors related to the defendant’s developmental age and capacity for moral judgment.
These could include the social context in which the defendant grew up, their exposure to traumatic events, whether they were living as an adult, and their cognitive, emotional, and mental health.
After applying the proper standard, the SCC concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness has been rebutted.”
In their dissent, Côté and Rowe said they would have dismissed the defendant’s appeal. Departing from the majority, the two justices said that courts should use a standard of satisfaction – rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt – to assess whether the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness has been rebutted.
“The presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness is not a fact to prove; it is a legal standard,” the justices said. “To rebut that presumption, the Crown must satisfy the court that the youth offender has the level of ‘maturity, moral sophistication and capacity for independent judgment of an adult.’
“This does not create a factual inquiry, as the majority finds,” the justices said, adding, “The final conclusion a court must draw as to whether it is satisfied that the presumption has been rebutted is not a ‘fact.’ Rather, it is a standard of persuasion, and one that is not equipped to be laid on a scale of probabilities.”
In a statement on Friday, Nader Hasan, a partner at Stockwoods LLP who represented the defendant, said, “Our client is very happy with this outcome. However, he will never forgive himself for the harm he caused the victim and his family. He made a horrific mistake when he was 17 years old. He is grateful now to have a second chance.”
Hasan noted that the SCC’s decision “has restored the basic presumption that youth offenders should be sentenced as youths – with a focus on rehabilitation. Children are children even when they have done something terrible.
“We are hopeful that today’s decision will provide clarity to youth sentencing courts across the country to help ensure greater fairness in youth sentencing.”
R. v. S.B.
In R. v. S.B., the defendant was 16 years old when he and two other youths lured another teenager into a stairwell of an apartment building, where the defendant shot him in the head.
After the murder, the defendant instructed the two other youths to help him cover up the murder, and he expressed a desire to kill a third person who had witnessed the mother, as well as his mother and sister.
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced as an adult. The sentencing judge imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole for 10 years. A Court of Appeal upheld the sentence.
The SCC majority agreed with the lower courts. While the Court of Appeal erred by failing to apply the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard while assessing whether the defendant lacked diminished moral blameworthiness, the appellate court’s error had no impact on the sentence, the majority said.
In their dissent, Côté and Rowe said they agreed with the majority that the Court of Appeal came to the correct conclusion. However, as in R. v. I.M., the justices disagreed with the majority that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the correct standard when assessing whether the Crown has successfully rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness.
Laura Remigio, an associate at Derstine Bariteau who represented S.B., said while she was disappointed that the SCC dismissed their appeal, “we do think that the S.B. case and the I.M. case have substantial precedential value.”
She noted the decision provided guidance “in an area of law where there hasn’t been a lot of clarity.
“It clarifies the fact that to rebut the presumption of moral culpability, which is required under Section 72(1) of the YCJA, the Crown needs [proof] beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot rely on the seriousness of the offense, which a lot of Crowns have been relying on in lower courts.”
Kristen Dulysh, who worked with Remigio on the case, added that the decision represents the first time the SCC confirmed that social context evidence is relevant when assessing whether young defendants should be sentenced as adults.
“The fact that the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the relevance of social context evidence is significant and is going to have a significant impact on all cases,” she said.
A spokesperson for Ontario’s Ministry of the Attorney General, which prosecuted the cases, said the ministry is reviewing the decision and declined to comment further.
